hand that Adam Smith had talked about often seems invisible: in fact, it often isn't there. In general, whenever information is imperfect, and risk markets are incomplete, markets are not efficient.
The Underlying Failure of Modern Macroeconomics: Ignoring Market Failures
Modern macroeconomics forgot or ignored these very important lessons. It constructed models that assumed that information is perfect, and that risk markets were essentially perfect, or were unimportant. Modern macroeconomics made a set of assumptions under which markets always worked well. So it wasn't a surprise, at least to me, that most of these macroeconomists and their models didn't do a good job in the context of the current crisis -they didn't predict the crisis.
Failing to Predict the Crisis
The standard macroeconomic models (and the macroeconomists who relied on those models) totally missed calling the most important economic event of the last 75 years.
The test of science -economic science or any other science -is the ability to predict.
A major crisis is the most important economic event that anybody could ask the science to predict, and their models didn't. So by this crucial measure, the modern macroeconomics failed, and failed very badly.
A Theory That Says That Bubbles Don't Occur
But the theory's failure was worse than not predicting the crisis: it actually said that these kinds of crises could not occur. 2 They would not occur, because markets were efficient; if markets were efficient, there can't be bubbles; if bubbles don't exist, they can't break; and if they don't break, there can't be the consequences that we are now confronting. So the series of events that actually led to the crisis were written off as impossible: according to the theory, what happened simply couldn't occur.
Even after the Bubble Broke, They Failed to Understand the Consequences
Not only did they say the crisis couldn't occur and thus didn't predict it, even when the bubble broke, those who were indoctrinated in these models, including the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, still effectively said, Don't worry, the problems are contained. There's a little problem of subprime mortgages, but they won't affect the economy.
Well, the Chairman was wrong. The models that have been used, on which the Fed has based its economic policies for a long time, said the risks would be diversified. So when Ben Bernanke made the statement that it was contained, he was making it on the basis of economic models, economic models that were fundamentally wrong both in their economic assumptions and their mathematical structure.
How the Models Contributed to Making the Crisis
Now there is growing consensus about some of the mistakes that occurred both before and after the crisis. Before the crisis, for instance, there was the view by central banks (monetary authorities) that keeping inflation low and stable was necessary and almost sufficient for economic stability and prosperity. But that's obviously wrong. The US kept inflation very low and very stable. In fact, Greenspan prided himself on the "Great Moderation": we had seemingly succeeded in solving the problem of inflation, and that had led the way to rapid economic expansion (so it was believed). Actually it was not the US that "solved" the inflation problem; it was really China, which kept prices low and exchange rates stable so that many American consumers could get goods at low prices. Greenspan may have claimed the victory, but it was not really his.
But the fact is that despite the low inflation, we had a major economic crisis, from which we are still suffering. Evidently, low inflation does not guarantee real economic stability or high long-term growth. The models used by central banks (the standard macroeconomic models) talked about the distortions that result from low inflation, changes in the relative prices; we call them "deadweight losses." These losses were a tenth-order effect relative to the losses that the economy has experienced because of the financial collapse. The US has already lost trillions of dollars in the gap between our actual output and potential output. The crisis has been enormously costly.
Incentives Matter, But Are Left out of the Models
The crisis should be very disturbing to anyone who believed in Adam Smith's invisible hand. Greenspan, in testimony before the Congress after the collapse, said that he was surprised about what had happened. He and many other central bankers from around the world talked about self-regulation, and how the markets could regulate themselves. In his speech, he acknowledged that he made a mistake in thinking that markets would manage their risks better, and that he was surprised about this. For my part, I was surprised that he was surprised, because the economics I study say that incentives matter. And when you look at the incentives, it's clear that those in the financial sector had incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking and in shortsighted behavior. It was the logical reaction to these perverse incentives and the loose regulatory environment that gave them free rein. If they had not behaved badly, we would have had to revise our textbooks. But they did behave badly, just as the incentives led them to behave. in the financial markets) is a subject that is totally excluded from the standard macromodels. The macro-models left out banks, they left out bankers, they left out corporate governance, they left out everything that's important. They left out risk markets, they left out information.
Markets

Mis-modeling Financial Markets and Failures in Guidance after the Crisis
The whole function of financial markets centers around risk and information, allocating capital and managing risk. The financial sector mismanaged risk, created risk, and misallocated capital. This is a massive market failure, which is totally excluded from the framework of the macroeconomic models that were used in most countries around the world. In those models, markets are always efficient. Not only did the models actually lead to policies that led to the crisis, they didn't really give very much assistance when the crisis happened. They didn't give government the advice or the frameworks with which to respond to the crisis. It's not surprising, because among the macro-models, there were almost none in which credit played an important role. The crisis was a credit crisis, a crisis in our banking system. And since the macro-models did not incorporate good models of credit and banking, they have nothing to say.
The critical issue, then, that the US, the UK and other countries faced was what to do with the banks, how to restructure them, how to provide them capital, how to get them to go back to doing what they're supposed to be doing (which is lending), and how to restart the collapsed "shadow banking" (securities market), or if doing so was even desirable. The upshot is that years after the crisis -remember the bubble broke in early 2007 and we are now in 2011 -the banks are still not lending in the US to the small-and medium-sized enterprises. Unemployment in the US is still high, although the rate has come down to just around 9 percent, from a high above 10 percent. But one out of six Americans who'd like a full-time job still cannot get one. The mortgage market is still in shambles, with real estate prices continuing to decline.
In short, the US (and Europe) continues to face serious economic problems, but the standard macro-models have provided inadequate guidance on how to get back to full employment quickly.
Who Is to Blame?
There is a lot of discussion in the US about who is to blame for the crisis. In my interpretation, at the core of the crisis was a failure of the banking system and the financial system, but the regulators were also to blame. The regulators should have known that banks behave badly if they are unregulated. Banks have done that over and over again. We've had crises in market economies regularly for the last 200 years. Just since the deregulation movement that began about 1980 with Reagan and Thatcher, the world has had more than 100 crises. The mistake of the regulators was to not regulate, and instead promote self-regulation.
Thus, the banks are at the center of the crisis, but the regulators are also to blame because they didn't stop the banks from behaving in the bad way that banks always do when you don't regulate them.
The third source of blame is the economists that gave the policy-makers the modelsincluding the models that said that markets are self-regulating. Policymakers, unfortunately, took such advice too seriously -perhaps because these free market economists were telling them what they wanted to hear. That's why we have to fix not only our economy, but also economics. And that's the future task for those of you students here. It's also a great opportunity.
Restoring the Economy to Health
Let me try to highlight the nature of the economic problem and the ways in which our policies haven't responded adequately. In the wake of the crisis, the resources of the US are the same as they were beforehand. We have the same physical capital, the same human capital, and the same assets that we had before the crisis. What we've done is eliminate one of the distortions associated with mispricing of housing. One might guess that since we now have the same resources as before the crisis, and since we corrected a major market failure in pricing, we would have a higher output and our economy should be working better, not worse. Output should be greater after the crisis than before. But the output is lower than it was. So what went wrong? That's a really important question.
What is very clear is that markets by themselves have not used our society's resources well. The banks realized they couldn't fix even their own problems, and they turned to the government. But the economists didn't give the government the policies and frameworks for them to think about what should be done. They still aren't, for the most part.
Austerity: Moving the Economy in the Wrong Direction
Right now, the debate in the US is going exactly the wrong way again because of the influence of the economists: too many of the wrong macroeconomists are giving advice. These economists looked at our budget deficit, said we had a problem, and recommended austerity. But here again, they have misdiagnosed the problem. The deficit was caused by the fact that the economy was weak; because the economy collapsed, revenues went down and that created the deficit. The best way to deal with the deficit is very simple: put Americans back to work. If all Americans were working, if the economy was up to its potential, then we would not have the serious deficit problem that we have today. Unfortunately, the recipe that many people are talking about for deficit reduction would make the problem worse by weakening the economy, therefore lowering tax revenue and exacerbating the deficit. So what should be done? It is actually fairly simple.
Fixing the Banks
First we have to fix the banks and the financial system. We have to get them back to doing what they're supposed to do, which is provide credit to small-and medium-sized enterprises and a whole variety of other things that are necessary for the economy. It would take longer to describe all the necessary steps than the time I have available this evening, but what is clear is that what has been done is inadequate. And there are clear alternatives that could have been undertaken.
Fiscal Policy
The second thing is that we need fiscal policy; we need to stimulate the economy. We can stimulate the economy by investing in the economy, make investment in infrastructure, education, and technology. Investment in infrastructure, education and technology stimulates the economy in the short run and promotes growth in the long run, and both increase tax revenue. It's what China did back in 1997 and 1998. When I was the chief economist of the World Bank, I used to go around and say that what the IMF was doing was exactly the opposite of what we teach in macroeconomics. By advocating budget cuts and high interest rates, it was encouraging the countries to go into recession and depression, and it succeeded! China followed Keynesian economics, which unfortunately fell out of favor in much of modern macroeconomics, and it stimulated its economy with investments that provided a basis for its rapid growth after the crisis was over. That's what the US should do today. The evidence is overwhelming that fiscal policy works and over the long run, if you make good investments, fiscal policy can actually reduce the national debt and provide a strong basis for fiscal stability.
Prior to the crisis, many economists argued that fiscal policy was relatively ineffective.
In fact, some economists claimed that it was totally ineffective. (2003) , that explain why, based on theories of banking and credit. But, as I suggested, the "mainstream" models gave short shrift to these. There is an important warning from the econometric work that suggested the effectiveness of monetary policy and the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy. Of course, in periods of full employment, fiscal expansions are not likely to increase GDP, because the effects will be offset, for example by increases in interest rates by central banks. But today, unemployment is high, and there is no reason that monetary policy would take offsetting actions. One needs to take extreme caution when looking at studies showing what has happened in the past on average and considering applying them to a situation such as the current one, which is very different.
Restructuring Debt
The third thing that has to be done is to restructure debt. Almost one out of four Americans who have mortgages on their homes owe more on their home than the value of the mortgage. This is an important lesson for anybody who says bubbles don't exist. If you create mortgages in the bubble, you are going to wind up with a large number of people who owe more money than the value of their house, because when the bubble breaks, the value goes down and the amount they owe does not.
That has resulted in an enormous social and economic trauma. You can imagine what it's like for American families who are losing their homes. Already 7 million have lost their homes, and we expect another 2 million to lose their homes this year and millions more to lose their homes in future years. (These numbers seem small: every time I mention a number in China, it's small, but for us it's a big number.) So we are having an economic and social crisis. People are not going to start spending when they are so deeply in debt. The economy cannot really start going unless you restructure the debt.
This is a principle we understand. We have bankruptcy laws for corporations that get into trouble. We give them a fresh start. We restructure their debt and we let them start again, because it's important to keep assets used and not to weigh corporations down with debt in a way that prevents them from being used productively. That's why corporate restructuring is a basic part of a successful market economy. In my view, families are important, but we are not allowing our families to restructure their debt, so the American families are being burdened down by the overweight of debt. Our economy won't be fixed until we do that.
Legal Frameworks
The point I raised just now has important ramifications that I want to note. When people talk about market economies, they often forget that a market economy always operates with a set of rules: a set of laws. We have laws on banking regulation and antitrust. Now, you can have good laws and you can have bad laws. Market economies can still work with bad laws, but the economic and social outcomes may be far from desirable. For instance, the bankruptcy law the US passed in 2005 makes it much harder for debtors to discharge their debts, encouraged the banks to engage in reckless lending, and has contributed to our economy's problems, and to immense suffering by many of America's poor. In other words, for an economic system to work, you need a whole set of rules of the game. And you have to be very careful about writing those rules. If you get the wrong rules, the system doesn't work as well as it does with "good" rules. If you don't have good competition laws, you don't have competition. You wind up with monopolies. You will get an inefficient economy. These laws are important parts of the economic system. Right now, China is very well-positioned with regard to writing the laws. If you get them wrong, it's going to be very hard to change. When you have a particular legal framework, there are going to be vested interests that develop within that framework and want to keep it, because those interests make money from it. The banks like the way the banking system worked before the crisis, because they made a lot of money from it. They don't want So we have had a very hard time changing our regulatory system.
Concluding Remarks
I hope in the last few minutes I have been able to explain the way in which the conventional macroeconomics that became popular in the past 20 years is very flawed. The good news is that many of the ingredients for a better macroeconomics are already here. There's a lot of research on microeconomics, banking and finance, but that research has to be put together to form a model of the entire economy, a model of macroeconomics. This is in fact a very exciting time for economics. This is an ambitious task on which I think there's going to be progress in the coming years. The construction of a better macroeconomics is something that is well within our grasp
There is, in fact, a global community of scholars that is now working on precisely this issue. It's called the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET), and it has been getting a lot of support from a variety of circles, including Paul Volcker, the former Fed chairman, and UK regulator Adair Turner. At recent meetings held at Cambridge and at Bretton Woods, there was a broad consensus that the macro-models that have dominated the economics profession for the past 20 years were badly flawed and had contributed to getting the global financial market and economy into their current troubles, and that there is a need for new thinking in economics.
Fixing the Regulatory Framework
Among the ideas around which a consensus is building is that financial regulations are needed and regulations matter; the regulations that existed before the crisis were deficient, but the regulations haven't yet been adequately fixed. The US passed the law last summer called the Dodd-Frank bill. It's a step in the right direction, but it's so full of holes that I describe it as a "Swiss cheese" law. It has some good things, but it's also smelly. It's filled with exceptions and exemptions. For example, they created something like a consumer product safety commission. Some of the financial products are like the nuclear power plants, too dangerous to touch. And you shouldn't have them. Like a drug, you need to test these products, make sure that they do what they claim to do, that they are safe for use by ordinary people. But while they said banks shouldn't engage in predatory practices, loans for automobiles were exempted. Why should it be a good idea to allow predatory lending? It makes absolutely no sense. The only reason is that the automobile lobby paid enough money to get an exemption.
The more fundamental problem for global financial stability is that of the too-big-tofail banks. Why is that a problem? If it's too big to fail, it means that it can undertake big risks. If it succeeds, the risk pays off and the bank walks off with the profits. But if it fails, it's the taxpayers who bear the costs, because government is obliged to bail out the toobig-to-fail banks. We call it "ersatz capitalism," where we privatize gains and socialize losses.
Unfortunately, that's what we have in America. And, also unfortunately, we did not fix this problem. The same incentives still exist. The system is dynamically unstable because the banks that are too big to fail (and everyone knows which banks these are) get capital at a lower interest rate. Giving them money is less risky because it's understood that the government will bail them out if they get in trouble. So the too-big-to-fail banks are more successful not because they are more efficient, but because they get hidden subsidies from the government. Economically, the case against these too-big-to-fail banks is simple and compelling, but the politics works against reform: they have the money to influence policies, to forestall reforms that work against their interests, so we've failed to fix the system. The problems in macroeconomics are global. An obvious example is that the global financial crisis was made in the US and then exported around the world. Regulations have to be global because if they are not global, there is going to be arbitrage across borders. We need a reform of the global reserve system. It's an anachronism in the 21st century that a single currency, the dollar, has a central role.
Moreover, it is not a good store of value: it's volatile and has all kinds of risks, including that of inflation. The 21st century needs a global reserve system to match the global economy. In short, there is a rich policy agenda ahead: policies to resuscitate the economy today and to ensure that a recurrence of such a crisis is less likely and less costly; reforms in how monetary and fiscal policy are conducted; reforms in financial regulation and in the global monetary system. Economics -theory and evidence -is needed to inform these reforms. Hopefully, those of your generation will do a better job than those of the last. There is a final remark I want to make. When I was an undergraduate student beginning my study of economics, I sometimes felt a moment of sadness, because it seemed I was born just a little bit too late: all the great ideas had already been discovered. Keynesian economics, I thought, was a brilliant idea. I wished I had been around before Keynes so I could have discovered those ideas. But I came to find out that there were some other holes in economic theory that I could spend my time We really do need to rethink principles of not only macroeconomics, but also other aspects of economics, including how to achieve growth that is stable and sustainable, and growth with benefit that is widely shared. We clearly need a better understanding of how economic systems work.
I wish all of you luck in your future research endeavors.
Question: You were senior advisor to President Clinton. Were you aware of the financial problems before the crisis took place in 2007?
Stiglitz: The answer is yes. When I was President Clinton's economic adviser, we had a lot of discussion of deregulation, for instance, over the repeal of the GlassSteagall Act (which separated commercial and investment banking activities). I very strongly opposed the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act. I thought it would raise three issues. One, it could contribute to the problem of too-big-to-fail banks, which I mentioned just some minutes ago. Secondly, we have two kinds of banks, commercial banks and the investment banks. Commercial banks are supposed to take savings of ordinary individuals, protect them, and invest them conservatively; investment banks take rich people's money and gamble. I thought putting the two together was a major mistake, because you would wind up gambling with ordinary people's money. That's exactly what happened. That was the second objection. The third was that there are many conflicts of interest that can arise when people who are issuing securities (the investment banks) are also people who are lending to the firms whose securities they are issuing (in their role as a commercial bank). The reality of these conflicts came out very strongly in the Enron and WorldCom scandals around 2001. So I was very strongly against this repeal. I can say that as long as I was in the Clinton administration, the administration didn't ask Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, but after I left, they did.
But I don't know if it was because I had been able to stop it. There were undoubtedly many other factors in the politics. have a PhD, let alone a Nobel Prize, to figure out that this can't continue. So the notion that you shouldn't do anything about the bubble -because you couldn't be certain that there was in fact a bubble -was just wrong. As I said, you can't tell it for certain, but it was very likely.
The Fed didn't want to believe there was a bubble, because they wanted to believe this ideology, this religion that the market economy is efficient, and in this religion a bubble is impossible.
The other argument they gave was also flawed: they said that the interest rate is a blunt instrument, but the only instrument they had. We can't solve the problem of the asset price bubble with the same instrument used to stabilize the rest of the economy.
Trying to stabilize asset prices with this blunt instrument risked destabilizing the rest of the economy. Again, that's wrong. The central bank has many instruments. It can raise the margin requirements, it can raise the down payment requirements, it can take administrative measures and impose lending restrictions and take other regulatory measures: there are, in fact, a whole host of instruments at its disposal. But for ideological reasons, they said we can only use interest rates as a mechanism for controlling the economy. Regrettably, some central banks of other parts of the world are coming under the influence of the same idea: that you should only use interest rates. Controlling a complex economy can't be done with a single instrument. But, fortunately, there are a range of price and non-price instruments available.
Because the Fed was so committed to the ideology that free markets always work, they refused to do anything, to make use of any of the instruments at their disposal. In the end, the cost to our society and our economy of that commitment to that ideology was enormous.
The blinders that economic theory and ideology put on policy-makers made it impossible for them to see the bubble as it was forming, to recognize the consequences of its breaking, and to do things that they could have done and should have done to deal with the aftermath. But for these blinders, the bubble, its bursting, and the aftermath were completely foreseeable. We in the West have all paid a high price for these failures. (Edited by Xiaoming Feng) 
